Magecart: A Real-World Example of Typosquatting

Introduction

Cybercriminals have been getting sneakier with how they hide their malicious activity to look like normal web browsing. A recent example is the Magecart hacking group’s abuse of a look-alike domain, gstatlc.org, which closely mimics Google’s legitimate gstatic.com domain. This is called typosquatting, a type of cyberattack where criminals register similarly named domains for malicious purpose. This malicious typosquat has been used to inject credit card skimming code into e-commerce websites, putting customer data at risk. In this article, we’ll explore how Magecart conducts these attacks using malicious JavaScript, the broader threat of typosquatting and domain impersonation, and how tools like Spoof Checker can help cybersecurity teams detect and neutralize such threats before they cause harm.

Magecart’s Gstatlc.org Typosquat Attack on E-Commerce

Magecart is an umbrella term for a loose consortium of cybercriminal groups known for web skimming – injecting malicious JavaScript into online checkout pages to steal payment data. Threat researchers have even found malicious domains masquerading as Google sites to hide Magecart skimmers​. Gstatlc.org is another domain that Magecart has recently registered that has been found to hide Magecart skimmers. The malicious domain gstatlc.org differs from gstatic.com by just one letter (replacing the “i” with an “l”), making it a typosquat designed to appear legitimate at a glance​. By exploiting a vulnerable e-commerce site (in many cases running platforms like Magento), the attackers injected code that opened a WebSocket connection to wss://gstatlc[.]org and pulled in additional malicious scripts.

Once activated, this skimmer code captures sensitive information from unsuspecting shoppers in real-time. It listens for input in payment forms – such as credit card numbers, names, addresses, and other details – and then exfiltrates that data to the attackers’ server. In this campaign, the stolen information is sent over the WebSocket to the Magecart command-and-control (C2) infrastructure hosted at the gstatlc.org domain. Threat intelligence databases have flagged gstatlc.org as a Magecart indicator (IOC) with high confidence, confirming that the domain is controlled by attackers and used for illicit data collection. By impersonating a Google domain, the skimmer traffic may blend in with normal web traffic, making detection harder. A busy administrator or security tool might overlook “gstatlc” as just another Google resource, illustrating how a single-character deception can facilitate a serious breach.

Magecart Skimming Tactics: Malicious JavaScript and Impersonation

Magecart’s success lies in its clever use of malicious JavaScript that executes in the user’s browser without obvious signs. These attackers typically gain access to a target website through compromised third-party plugins, supply chain attacks, or unpatched vulnerabilities. Once they can insert code, they often choose to hide in plain sight. For example, Magecart scripts have been found impersonating legitimate services like Google Tag Manager or Google Analytics by using similar code snippets and naming conventions. In some cases, the skimmer is injected as an inline script that visually resembles a normal third-party tag, making website owners less suspicious.

To avoid detection, Magecart attackers heavily obfuscate their code. Techniques include Base64-encoding URLs and payloads so that security scanners won’t easily flag suspicious domains or keywords. In the gstatlc.org attack, the malicious JavaScript was hidden behind an encoded WebSocket URL and only revealed its true destination (the rogue domain) after decoding at runtime. The use of a WebSocket connection and eval (or function constructors) to execute received code is another Magecart hallmark, allowing the skimmer to fetch instructions on the fly and execute them in the browser.

Once the skimmer is live on a page, any customer who enters payment information will have their data intercepted and sent to the attacker’s server. The victim completes checkout as usual, often unaware anything malicious occurred, while in the background the credit card details and personal info have been siphoned off to a remote domain. Magecart groups then typically sell this stolen data on dark web markets or use it for fraud. High-profile breaches at companies like British Airways and Ticketmaster were caused by Magecart web skimmers operating in this stealthy manner, highlighting that even well-resourced organizations can fall victim. British Airways was fined a hefty £183m for the breach. For smaller companies – which may have fewer IT defenses – these tactics are especially dangerous. A Magecart attack leveraging a domain impersonation (like a fake Google domain) is essentially a supply chain attack on trust: it exploits the trust users and site owners place in familiar third-party domains to carry out theft under the radar.

Typosquatting: The Broader Threat of Look-Alike Domains

Typosquatting, also known as URL hijacking or domain mimicry, is the practice of registering look-alike domains that prey on common typos or visual similarities to legitimate websites​. In this case, gstatlc.org is a typosquat of Google’s gstatic.com, leveraging the subtle “i” to “l” swap which can be easily missed. Such deceptive domains can trick users and even automated systems into trusting them. For example, a user hurriedly glancing at a URL may not spot the difference, or an email filter might not flag a domain that isn’t an exact match but looks close enough to a known safe domain.

A one-letter difference: gstatic.com vs gstatlc.org. Attackers register look-alike domains (typosquats) to exploit human oversight and trust.

Typosquatted domains are used in a variety of malicious ways. A classic scenario is phishing: an attacker creates a website at a look-alike domain (for instance, “micros0ft.com” replacing the letter “o” with a zero) to steal login credentials or distribute malware. Users think they’re on a trusted site, especially if the page is a pixel-perfect clone of the original, and may enter sensitive information. Another use is for malware delivery and drive-by downloads – e.g., hosting fake software updates on a domain like “adobe-secure.com” to trick users into downloading malware. Typosquats are even employed in email spoofing: a criminal registers a domain similar to a company’s and sends fraudulent emails that appear to come from a legitimate business partner or brand.

The strategy is low-cost and surprisingly effective. Millions of typographical errors are made by users daily, and attackers capitalize on this. A study by Palo Alto Networks found that over 13% of newly registered domains in one year were typosquatted versions of well-known brands. The financial impact is significant: typosquatting is estimated to cost businesses over $300 million annually in lost revenue, legal costs, and reputational damage. When customers are diverted to imposter sites or have their data stolen, legitimate businesses suffer an erosion of trust that can be hard to rebuild.

Crucially, typosquatting isn’t just about tricking end-users – it can also fool security controls if not tuned properly. In Magecart’s case, the domain gstatlc.org might bypass simple allow/block lists that assume domains containing “gstatic” or starting with “gs” are benign Google assets. It underscores the importance of vigilant domain verification in security systems. In summary, a typosquat domain leverages a tiny mistake – one missed letter – to create a large security hole. Whether used for Magecart skimming or broader phishing campaigns, these look-alike domains are a pervasive threat that organizations must account for in their defense strategy.

Detecting Domain Impersonation and Protecting Your Business

Given the risks, how can businesses defend against domain impersonation and typosquatting attacks like these? A multi-pronged approach is needed – one that combines technology, best practices, and user awareness:

• Domain Impersonation Monitoring: Early detection is key. Specialized services like Spoof Checker provide domain impersonation monitoring, continuously scanning for newly registered domains that resemble your brand or other high-value targets. For example, a monitoring tool could have alerted Google (or any observer who set up tracking) that gstatlc.org was registered, given its similarity to gstatic.com. These services typically use algorithms to generate common typo variants and check domain registrations in real time. When a potential typosquat or spoof domain is found, alerts are sent out so your security team can investigate and respond. Spoof Checker, in particular, scans millions of domains daily and provides automated alerts when a look-alike domain is detected. This gives businesses a chance to act before the domain is used in an attack – for instance, by contacting the registrar to suspend the domain, or by adding the domain to web filters and firewalls to block any traffic.
• Typosquatting Detection and Response: In addition to monitoring, businesses should implement a process for responding to detected typosquats. This may include defensive domain registration – proactively buying up common misspellings and variations of your own domain name to prevent attackers from doing so. Large companies often do this (e.g., owning the .net, .org, and slight misspellings of their .com), but businesses can adopt this strategy for their key domains at relatively low cost. If a malicious domain is detected that you don’t own, having a plan to file abuse complaints or takedown requests can save precious time. Some domain monitoring tools offer streamlined takedown support, helping you contact registrars or authorities quickly. Spoof Checker offers to buy and maintain look-alike domains on behalf of businesses.
• Secure Your Web Supply Chain: Magecart attacks remind us that third-party code can be a Trojan horse. Review what external scripts and integrations your website loads. Consider implementing Content Security Policy (CSP) headers that restrict which domains your site can load scripts from. A strict CSP might have prevented a browser from connecting to gstatlc.org at all, by only allowing known domains (though caution: CSP needs maintenance to avoid breaking legitimate functionality). Similarly, using subresource integrity (SRI) attributes for externally loaded scripts can ensure that only expected code executes. Solutions also exist to monitor client-side behavior, alerting on suspicious script activities in users’ browsers (for example, unexpected WebSocket connections or credit card form hooks), which can catch skimmers in action.
• Email and Brand Protection: Typosquatted domains are frequently used for email phishing. Ensure you have DMARC, SPF, and DKIM email authentication in place to stop attackers from sending emails that appear to come from your domain. While this doesn’t stop them from using look-alike domains, it does prevent exact-domain spoofing. Train employees to spot look-alike URLs in emails (for instance, gstatic.com vs gstatlc.org) and to report anything suspicious. Some advanced email security gateways can flag domains that are visually similar to known trusted domains, adding another layer of defense. Get a free Spoofability Report to see if your email authentication is properly configured.
• Threat Intelligence and Blocking: Leverage threat intelligence feeds which often include known malicious domains (like those associated with Magecart). If gstatlc.org had been identified by threat intel (as it was on ThreatFox), feeding this information into your network security controls (DNS firewalls, secure web gateways, etc.) could automatically block communications to that domain. Many security tools allow businesses to import threat feeds or subscribe to updates, so that “known bad” domains are stopped without manual effort.
• Regular Security Audits: Lastly, incorporate checks for typosquat exposure in your regular security audits. This means not only scanning your own infrastructure but also looking outward: What domains out there look like they could be aiming at your customers or employees? Some companies periodically use open-source tools or services to generate permutations of their domains and search for active sites. For example, our Spoof Checker tool currently detects 1,029 registered variants of “website.com”, highlighting just how many potential threats can exist outside your perimeter. A business might find that one of these domains is hosting a phishing page and then work with law enforcement or the hosting provider to take it down. Being proactive in this way can save your reputation and prevent an attack before it starts.
  

By implementing these measures, businesses create overlapping layers of defense. Typosquatting detection and domain monitoring address the problem at its root by catching the impostor domains early. Hardening your website and educating users addresses the ways attackers might leverage those domains (whether through injected scripts or phishing emails). The goal is to break the kill chain of an attack like Magecart’s: even if the bad guys register a crafty domain and manage to slip code into your site, strong security practices can prevent data exfiltration and trigger alarms before serious damage is done.

Conclusion

Typosquatting and Magecart attacks underscore a simple truth: one misspelled letter can lead to a devastating breach. For businesses, whose e-commerce platforms and customer trust are lifelines, the stakes couldn’t be higher. The case of gstatlc.org shows how cunning attackers can be, using a spoofed domain to impersonate a trusted service and pilfer credit card data in real time. The good news is that with vigilance and the right tools, these threats can be mitigated. Investing in cybersecurity measures like domain impersonation monitoring, web skimming defenses, and staff training will pay off by reducing the risk of incidents that could cost far more in the long run.

Don’t wait until your business’s name (or your customers’ data) is on a cybercriminal’s target list. Strengthen your security posture today. Consider using a spoof domain checker service such as Spoof Checker to actively monitor for copycat domains and receive instant alerts on potential threats. At the same time, review your website for any unauthorized scripts and ensure all third-party integrations are secure and up to date. By taking these proactive steps, you can stay one step ahead of attackers – catching typosquat campaigns and Magecart skimmers before they strike. Protect your business by making it part of your routine to detect, monitor, and respond to domain impersonation. With the right defenses in place, even the sneakiest hacker tricks will have a hard time catching you or your customers off guard.

Your customers trust your brand – make sure that trust is justified by safeguarding them from impostors. Start monitoring your domains and keep your business one typo away from safety. 🔒